Abstract PRIDE is a lightweight block cipher proposed at CRYPTO 2014 by Albrecht et al., who claimed that the construction of linear layers is efficient and secure. In this paper, we investigate the key schedule and find eight 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics, which can be used to construct 18-round related-key differentials. A study of the first subkey derivation function reveals that there exist three weak-key classes, as a result of which all the differences of subkeys for each round are identical. For the weak-key classes, we also find eight 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics. Based on one of the related-key differentials, we launch an attack on the full PRIDE block cipher. The data and time complexity are 2 39 chosen plaintexts and 2 92 encryptions, respectively. Moreover, by using multiple related-key differentials, we improve the cryptanalysis, which then requires 2 41.6 chosen plaintexts and 2 42.7 encryptions, respectively. Finally, we use two 17-round related-key differentials to analyze full PRIDE, which requires 2 35 plaintexts and 2 54.7 encryptions. These are the first results on full PRIDE, and show that the PRIDE block cipher is not secure against related-key differential attack.
Introduction
Recently, lightweight block ciphers have become more and more important owing to the emergence of low-resource devices such as sensor networks, RFID tags, mobile phones, and smart cards. During the last decade, a large number of lightweight block ciphers have been published for such resource-constrained environments, including PRESENT [1] , PRINTcipher [2] , LED [3] , LBlcok [4] , PRINCE [5] , NSA standard SIMON, and SPECK [6] .
PRIDE [7] , proposed at CRYPTO 2014, is a software-optimized lightweight block cipher with a good linear layer. The design goals of PRIDE place no specific restrictions on its key schedule. In terms of both speed and memory, PRIDE is comparable to SIMON and SPECK for the same platform. Some cryptanalytic results have been obtained on PRIDE. Zhao et al. [8] analyzed the results of a differential attack. Yang et al. [9] then presented an improved differential analysis of 19-round PRIDE. Dinur [10] devised new cryptanalytic time-memory-data tradeoff attacks on FX-constructions and applied these to PRIDE. Based on related-key attack [11] and differential cryptanalysis [12] , related-key differential attack was introduced by Kelsey et al. [13] . In this approach, the attacker can take control of the key difference and observe the operation of a cipher under several different keys. The utilization of the key difference to kill the state difference leads to more efficient characteristics and great improvements in some results. Combining related-key attack with other cryptanalysis approaches such as boomerang attack, rectangle attack, and impossible differential attack has led to a number of results on various block ciphers, including AES [14, 15] and KASUMI [16] , among others.
In this paper, we focus on cryptanalysis of the new block cipher PRIDE under related-key attack. By observing the key schedule and linear layer, we find eight 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics. We then discuss the first subkey derivation function g (1) r and find that there exist two differences Δg (1) r (k 1,2 ) = 0x80 and Δg (1) r (k 1,2 ) = 0x20 for which all the differences of subkeys for each round are identical. Also, the difference Δg (1) r (k 1,2 ) = 0x20 leads to three weak-key classes with 2 126. 4 or 2 122 keys. Based on this discovery, we find that there are another eight 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics. All the 2-round iterative characteristics can extend to 17-or 18-round relatedkey differentials. Moreover, based on one of the 18-round related-key differentials and some observations on the linear layer, we present an attack on full PRIDE with 2 39 chosen plaintexts and 2 92 encryptions. By using multiple related-key differentials, we improve the cryptanalysis, which then requires 2 41.6 plaintexts and 2 42.7 encryptions. Finally, we utilize two 17-round related-key differentials to analyze full PRIDE, which requires 2 35 plaintexts and 2 54.7 encryptions. These are the first results on full PRIDE, and they show that the PRIDE block cipher is not secure against related-key differential attack. These results also suggest that designers should take the key schedule into consideration, as has been done by Huang and Lai [17] in their investigation of the effective key length for a block cipher against a meet-in-the-middle attack. Our results, given in Subsections 5.2 and 5.3, are summarized and compared with previous results in Table 1 .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our notation and Section 3 gives a brief description of the lightweight block cipher PRIDE. Section 4 describes some 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics of PRIDE as well as other characteristics under three weak-key classes. Section 5 describes related-key differential attack on full PRIDE. Finally, Section 6 gives our conclusion.
Notation
The following notation is used in this paper: 
The round function of PRIDE. 
Description of PRIDE
PRIDE is an SPN-type lightweight block cipher with a block size of 64 bits and a 128-bit key. The round function consists of three operations: the state is XORed with the subkey, fed into 16 identical 4-bit S-boxes in parallel, and then permuted and processed by the linear layer (see Figure 1) . The cipher has 20 rounds, the first 19 of which are identical, and the linear layer of the last round is not necessary (see Figure 2 ).
The PRIDE S-box is given in Table 2 .
The linear layer L of PRIDE is divided into three parts: a permutation layer P , a matrix layer M , and another permutation P −1 , which is the inverse of P . The matrix layer M is given by
The linear layer is defined as follows:
The definitions of P (Table A1) , P −1 (Table A2) , and L i are given in detail in the Appendix A.
The 128-bit master key K of the block cipher PRIDE is divided into two 64-bit parts (k 0 ||k 1 ). k 0 is used for pre-and post-whitening. k 1 is divided into eight 8-bit words and used to generate the subkeys f r (k 1 ), defined by The difference of the intermediate state ΔIr 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
ΔXr 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
ΔYr 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
ΔZr 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
ΔWr 1000 1000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔI r+1 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 ΔX r+1 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 ΔY r+1 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 ΔZ r+1 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔW r+1 1000 1000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔI r+2 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
where the subkey derivation functions are
r (x) = (x + 193r) mod 256, g (2) r (x) = (x + 165r) mod 256, g (3) r (x) = (x + 81r) mod 256, g (4) r (x) = (x + 197r) mod 256, which are simply modulo-256 additions with one of four constants.
Related-key differential attack on PRIDE
In this section, after investigating the key schedule of the block cipher PRIDE, we present eight 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics. We then discuss g (1) r and find four 2-round iterative related-key differentials with Δg (1) r (k 1,2 ) = 0x80 and four 2-round characteristics under some weak-key classes.
Related-key differential characteristics of PRIDE
Because there are four nonlinear functions g
r (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) in the key schedule, we first consider related keys for which the input difference of g
r is the same. Assume that we are given a key K = k 0 ||k 1 and a related key K = k 0 ||k 1 , where
, which leads to the following equation:
At the same time, we have
so that all the differences of subkeys for each round are identical.
Theorem 1.
Assume that there are two related keys (K, K ) as presented above. Then there exist 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics with probability 2 −4 .
Proof. According to the difference distribution of the PRIDE S-box, S(0x8) = 0x8 holds with probability 2 −2 , which can be used to find 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics with probability 2 −4 (see Table 3 ). − − → 8000 8000 8000 0000 8000 8000 0000 0000 8800 0000 0000 0000 0800 0800 0800 0000 2r − − → 0800 0800 0800 0000 0800 0800 0000 0000 4400 0000 0000 0000 0080 0080 0080 0000 2r − − → 0080 0080 0080 0000 0080 0080 0000 0000 2200 0000 0000 0000 0008 0008 0008 0000 2r − − → 0008 0008 0008 0000 0008 0008 0000 0000 1100 0000 0000 0000 8000 8000 0000 0000 2r − − → 8000 8000 0000 0000 8000 8000 0000 0000 8800 0000 0000 0000 0800 0800 0000 0000 2r − − → 0800 0800 0000 0000 0800 0800 0000 0000 4400 0000 0000 0000 0080 0080 0000 0000 2r − − → 0080 0080 0000 0000 0080 0080 0000 0000 2200 0000 0000 0000 0008 0008 0000 0000 2r − − → 0008 0008 0000 0000 0008 0008 0000 0000 1100 0000 0000 0000
Therefore, there exist 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics under ΔK:
where Δk 0 = 0 and Δk 1 = 8800000000000000. Then, according to Table 3 , there are two active S-boxes in the 2-round path, so the probability of the 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics is 2 −4 .
The 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics show that there are two S-boxes in every two rounds. Thus, we can also consider characteristics on which one round has a nonactive S-box while the other has two S-boxes. In fact, such 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics do exist. For example, a 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristic with Δk 1 = 8800000000000000 can be represented as follows: 8000800000000000 1r − → 0000000000000000 1r − → 8000800000000000, which can be used to construct 17-and 18-round related-key differentials with probabilities 2 −32 and 2 −36 , respectively. All the related-key differentials can be used in an attack on full PRIDE.
There are a total of eight 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics, as listed in Table 4 .
Corollary 1.
Assume that there are two related keys (K, K ) as presented above. Then there exist 2n-round related-key differential characteristics with probability 2 −4n .
It is obvious that if 2 −4n > 2 −64 , then the related-key differentials can be used to attack the block cipher PRIDE. Because 2n = 20 for the PRIDE block cipher, the related-key differentials can be applied to analyze full PRIDE.
Other iterative characteristics
Based on the analysis in Subsection 4.1, if we change the positions of the input difference and the key difference, then there also exist other 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics with probability 2 −4 . However, when the positions are changed, it is obvious that only the first 16 bits of k 1 are nonzero, which means that the input difference of g (1) r is nonzero. In order to retain the iterative characteristics, it is necessary that all the differences of subkeys for each round are identical. Therefore, we first discuss g (1) r . Assume that the key difference occurs in k 1,2 and that Δk 1,2 = δ; the differences after the function g (1) i are δ i , i = 1, . . . , 20. The 2-round iterative characteristics require that all the differences of subkeys for each round be identical, that is, δ 1 = δ 2 = · · · = δ 20 . We have computationally generated all differences and values for k 1,2 (see Table 5 ). Table 5 shows that there are five cases meeting the condition that all the differences of subkeys for each round are identical. However, the difference 0xa0 cannot be used to construct the 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics with probability 2 −4 . When the input difference of g (1) r is nonzero, the 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics are as presented in Table 6 .
Of course, according to Tables 5 and 6 , we see that there are four 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics with Δk 1,2 = 0x80 and four 2-round iterative characteristics in the weak-key 0x80-0x8b, 0xa0-0xab, 0xc0-cxb, 0xe0-0xeb 0x80 0x80 0x0-0xff 256 0xa0 0xa0 0x0-0xb, 0x20-0x2b, 0x40-0x4b, 0x60-0x6b, 12 × 8 = 96
0x80-0x8b, 0xa0-0xab, 0xc0-cxb, 0xe0-0xeb 0x60 0x20 0x3f,0x5f,0xbf,0xdf 4 0xe0 0x20 0x1f,0x7f,0x9f,0xff 4 − − → 0000 8000 8000 8000 0000 8000 8000 0000 0880 0000 0000 0000 0000 0080 0080 0080 2r − − → 0000 0080 0080 0080 0000 0080 0080 0000 0220 0000 0000 0000 8000 8000 8000 0000 2r − − → 8000 8000 8000 0000 8000 0000 8000 0000 8080 0000 0000 0000 0080 0080 0080 0000 2r − − → 0080 0080 0080 0000 0080 0000 0080 0000 2020 0000 0000 0000 0000 8000 8000 0000 2r − − → 0000 8000 8000 0000 0000 8000 8000 0000 0880 0000 0000 0000 0000 0080 0080 0000 2r − − → 0000 0080 0080 0000 0000 0080 0080 0000 0220 0000 0000 0000 8000 0000 8000 0000 2r − − → 8000 0000 8000 0000 8000 0000 8000 0000 8080 0000 0000 0000 0080 0000 0080 0000 2r − − → 0080 0000 0080 0000 0080 0000 0080 0000 2020 0000 0000 0000
class with Δk 1,2 = 0x20, which has 2 126.4 (= 12 × 8 × 2 120 ) keys, or with Δk 1,2 = 0x60, 0xe0, which has 2 122 (= 4 × 2 120 ) keys.
Key recovery of the block cipher PRIDE
In this section, we first give some observations that can be used to filter the data. We then present an attack on full PRIDE using 2 41 chosen plaintexts and 2 92 encryptions. By using multiple related-key differentials, the cryptanalysis requires 2 41.6 chosen plaintexts and 2 42.7 encryptions. Finally, if we use 17-round related-key differentials with probability 2 −32 to analyze full PRIDE, the complexity of the cryptanalysis is 2 35 chosen plaintexts and 2 54.7 encryptions.
Some observations
is ΔW = ( * 000 * 000 0000 * 000), then its output difference is ΔZ = (0000 0000 * 000 0000) with probability 2
is ΔW = ( * 000 * 000 0000 * 000), then its output difference is ΔZ = (0000 0000 * 000 0000) with probability 2 −2 .
Since L −1 0 ( * 000 * 000 0000 * 000) = ( * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000), ( * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000) = (0000 0000 * 000 0000) holds with probability 2 −2 . The situation for L is ΔW = (0000 0 * 00 0000 * * 00), then its output difference is ΔZ = (0000 0000 * 000 0000) with probability 2 −2 . If the input difference of L −1 2 is ΔW = (0 * 00 0000 * * 00 0000), then its output difference is ΔZ = (0000 0000 * 000 0000) with probability 2 −2 .
Since ΔZ = L −1 1 (ΔW ) = (0000 00 * * * * * 0 0000), where ΔW = (0000 0 * 00 0000 * * 00), it is possible to construct a linear equation set as follows:
If these two equations are satisfied, then ΔZ r = (0000 0000 * 000 0000) holds with probability 2 −2 . The
2 is similar to that for L −1 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔX 19 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔY 19 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔZ 19 0000 0000 * 000 0000 0000 0000 * 000 0000 0000 0000 * 000 0000 0000 0000 * 000 0000 ΔW 19 * 000 * 000 0000 * 000 0000 0 * 00 0000 * * 00 0 * 00 0000 * * 00 0000 * 000 * 000 0000 * 000 ΔI 20 * 00 * 00 * 0 0000 0000 * 00 * 0 * 00 0000 0000 00 * 0 00 * 0 0000 0000 * * 0 * 0 * 00 0000 0000 ΔX 20 * 00 * 00 * 0 0000 0000 * 00 * 0 * 00 0000 0000 00 * 0 00 * 0 0000 0000 * * 0 * 0 * 00 0000 0000
ΔY 20 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 ⊕Δk 0 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 ΔC * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00 * * 00
is ΔW = ( * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000), then its output difference is ΔZ = ( * 000 * 000 0000 0000) with probability 2
is ΔW = ( * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000), then its output difference is ΔZ = ( * 000 * 000 0000 0000) with probability 2 −2 .
Since L −1 0 ( * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000) = ( * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000), ( * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000) = ( * 000 * 000 0000 0000) holds with probability 2 is ΔW = ( * 00 * * 00 * * 000 * 000), then its output difference is ΔZ = ( * 000 * 000 0000 0000) with probability 2 −4 . If the input difference of L −1 2 is ΔW = ( * 00 * * 00 * * 000 * 000), then its output difference is ΔZ = ( * 000 * 000 0000 0000) with probability 2 −4 .
Since ΔZ = L −1 1 (ΔW ) = ( * * * 0 * * * 0 * * 00 * * 00), where ΔW = ( * 00 * * 00 * * 000 * 000), it is possible to construct a linear equation set that has the following simple form:
If these four equations are satisfied, then ΔZ r = ( * 000 * 000 0000 0000) holds with probability 2 
Key-recovery attack using an 18-round path

Key recovery with one characteristic
Based on the 2-round iterative characteristic 8000800080000000 2r − → 8000800080000000, we can obtain an 18-round related-key differential characteristic with probability 2 −36 with Δk 1 = 880000000000000:
We add two rounds after the characteristic (see Table 7 ) and analyze the full PRIDE. The attack procedure is as follows:
(1) Data collection. Encrypt 2 38 pairs of plaintexts with a difference 0x8880000000000000. For the 2 38 pairs of ciphertexts, the adversary chooses the pairs that satisfy the output difference in Table 6 . There remain 2 6 (= 2 38 × 2 −32 ) pairs.
(2) Key recovery.
(a) Guess k 0 [1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14] one by one, decrypt the corresponding nibbles of ciphertexts partially, and check whether the difference of the decrypted nibbles is ΔX 20 = * 00 * , 00 * 0, * 00 * , 0 * 00, * 00 * , 00 * 0, * * 0 * , or 0 * 00. Therefore, the attack requires 2 39 chosen plaintexts and 2 92 encryptions.
Key recovery with multiple characteristics
In this subsection, we obtain a cryptanalytic result on full PRIDE with multiple related-key differentials. According to Table 4 For each case, we apply the attack procedure presented in Subsection 5.2.1. Before
Step (d), for Case 1, the procedure has guessed k 0 [1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14] and (M • P ) −1 (f 20 (k 1 )) [9] , and for Case 2, it has guessed k 0 [3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16] and (M • P ) −1 (f 20 (k 1 )) [11] . Therefore, if we use the two cases, the 64-bit key k 0 and the 8-bit key (M • P ) −1 (f 20 (k 1 )) [9, 11] have been guessed before Step (d), and then there is the 56-bit key information of k 1 that has not been guessed. Therefore, by using the two cases, the attack requires 2 × 2 39 chosen plaintexts and 2 56 encryptions.
Furthermore, if we use more related keys and related-key differentials, the time complexity of the attack can be reduced. For a time-data tradeoff, six cases are required. For example, we could add four more cases as follows: * * * * 0000 0000 0000 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔX 1 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔY 1 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔZ 1 1000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔW 1 1000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔI 2 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔI 19 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ΔX 19 1000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
ΔY 19 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
ΔZ 19 * 000 * 000 0000 0000 * 000 * 000 0000 0000 * 000 * 000 0000 0000 * 000 * 000 0000 0000
ΔW 19 * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000 * 00 * * 00 * * 000 * 000 * 00 * * 00 * * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000 * 000
ΔI 20 * * * * 0000 0000 0 * * 0 * * * * 0000 0000 0 * * 0 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 * * * * 0000 0000 0000
ΔX 20 * * * * 0000 0000 0 * * 0 * * * * 0000 0000 0 * * 0 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 * * * * 0000 0000 0000
ΔY 20 * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 0000 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 ⊕Δk 0 * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 * * * * * * * * 0000 0000 0000 * * * * 0000 0000 0000 ΔC * 00 * * 00 * * 000 * 000 * 00 * * 00 * * 000 * 000 * 00 * * 00 * * 000 * 000 * 00 * * 00 * * 000 * 000
Therefore, when the four additional cases are used, the attack requires 6 × 2 39 = 2 41.6 chosen plaintexts, and its time complexity is 2 41.6 + 6 × 2 35 + 6 × 2 39 + 2 40 ≈ 2 42.7 encryptions, which is the best time-data trade-off.
Key-recovery attack using a 17-round path
In this subsection, we recover the key by using another 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristic 8000800000000000 We add one round before the differential and two rounds after the differential (see Table 8 ), and then analyze full PRIDE. Here, we omit the initial permutation P −1 -layer.
The attack procedure is as follows: (1 
Conclusion
We first investigated and found some weaknesses of the key schedule. By utilizing these weaknesses, we found eight 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics that could be used to construct 18-round related-key differentials for the block cipher PRIDE. Then, after considering the function g
r , we also found four 2-round iterative related-key differential characteristics with Δg keys. Based on one of the related-key differentials, we attacked full PRIDE using 2 39 chosen plaintexts and 2 92 encryptions. Using multiple related-key differentials, the analysis required 2 41.6 plaintexts and 2 42.7 encryptions. Using the 17-round related-key differentials, the complexity of the cryptanalysis was 2 35 plaintexts and 2 54.7 encryptions. These are the first results on full PRIDE, and show that the PRIDE block cipher is not secure against a related-key differential attack. 
